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FOR DEATH UNDER ACCIDENT POLICY WHEN

DISEASE AND ACCIDENT COMBINE

To

CAUSE DEATH-WHERE EMO-

TIONAL STRESS AND STRAIN ARISING FROM AN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT
ARE SUPERIMPOSED UPON

A

DORMANT HEART CONDITION

So As To

CAUSE DEATH, RECOVERY MAY BE HAD UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF
AN INSURANCE POLICY INSURING AGAINST ACCIDENTAL BODILY INJURY
AND DEATH.

Boring v. Haynes, 496 P.2d 1385 (Kan. 1972).

H. 0. Boring's medical history reveals that he suffered a heart
attack on March 14, 1967, and following treatment, was released from
the hospital on April 4, 1967. On July 17, 1967, the car which he was
driving was struck in the rear by another vehicle. After the accident,
Mr. Boring got out of his car and talked to some of the people involved.
After ascertaining that there were no apparent injuries, he returned to
his car to survey the damage and collapsed to the ground. He was pronounced dead on arrival at a nearby hospital.
This action was brought by the beneficiaries under the policy on
Boring's life to recover death benefits.' Defendant insurer denied recovery on the basis that Boring's death was caused by the preexisting
heart condition and not by the accident.2 The district court granted
summary judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appealed. HeldReversed. Where emotional stress and strain arising from an automobile accident are superimposed upon a dormant heart condition so
as to cause death, recovery may be had under the provisions of an
insurance policy insuring against accidental bodily injury and death.
A major problem in the field of accident insurance has been whether
to allow recovery when disease and accident have combined to produce disability or death.3 "This interplay of accident and disease or
bodily infirmity has brought conflicting decisions in every jurisdic4
tion."
Accident policy provisions commonly exempt the insurer from liability in the event an insured's death arises from, or is caused by, disease or bodily infirmity.
In order to define risk intended to be covered, the accident insurer provides under the insuring clause that the insurance is
1 Boring had a group policy on his life in the sum of $25,000 with the defendant company. The insurance policy specifically excluded bodily injury "caused directly or inby disease." Boring v. Haynes, 496 P.2d 1385, 1387 (Kan.
directly, wholly or partly ...
1972).
2 By deposition, a medical doctor testified speculatively that Boring's death "was caused
by the influence of an episode of stress superimposed upon already existing circulatory
disease . . . and a previous myocardial infarction," and that Boring's death "was actually
precipitated by the superimposition of a stress episode." Id. at 1389-90 (emphasis added)
3 See Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 169 (1962).
4 G. RICHARDs, 2 RICHARDS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE § 226, at 771 (5th ed. W. Freedman
1952).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

1

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 4 [2022], No. 3, Art. 9

1972]

CASE NOTES

against losses resulting "solely" from accident or through accidental means, "independently" of all other causes. This insuring
clause language serves in some measure to exclude losses not
due to accident independent of all other causes but, rather, due
in part to bodily infirmity or disease. 5
The cases interpreting the typical contract requirement that the
accident be the sole and exclusive cause of the injury and that the insurer is not liable if the injury is caused wholly or partially or contributed to by disease are often difficult to reconcile. There is agreement that the insurer is liable when the accident led to the disease
resulting in injury or death. 6 The courts have regarded this as a direct
chain of causation set in motion by the accident, and have held the
companies liable without hesitation. 7 There is also agreement that
when the insured suffered from a disease before the accident, but the
accident would have caused death or disability even if the preexisting
disease had not been present, the insured can recovery
The incertitude arises when injury or death results from the combined effects of a preexisting disease9 and an accident. The terms "disease" and "infirmity" in accident insurance policies are generally
construed liberally in favor of the insured and refer only to disease
or infirmities of a somewhat chronic nature.10 Mr. Justice Cardozo
5 W. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE § 188, at 976 (3d ed. B. Anderson
1951).
6 Id. at 977. See also G. COUCH, 10 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d § 41:77 (2d ed. R. Anderson
1962).
7 See, e.g., Mutual Say. Life Ins. Co. v. Hines, 100 S.E.2d 466, 472 (Ga. Ct. App. 1957),
where the insured received severe burns over 40 per cent of her body which caused complicating disease from which she ultimately died. See also Barnett v. John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 24 N.E.2d 662 (Mass. 1939) where insured was injured in an automobile
accident and as a result of such injury developed pneumonia, empyema and endocarditis
which caused his death.
8W. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE § 188, at 977 (3d ed. B. Anderson
1951). See also Kundiger v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 15 N.W.2d 487, 490 (Minn. 1944)
where the court stated:
Under a life insurance policy containing provisions for double indemnity if death
be caused solely by accidental means but excepting death caused or contributed to
by disease, liability exists if an accidental injury was of such a nature as to cause
death solely and independently of a pre-existing disease.
9"The term 'pre-existing disease or infirmity' means disease or infirmity which preexists the accident, not the entering into of the policy ..
" Bronson & Fields, The Problem
of Concurrent Causation of Death under Health and Accident Policies: A Solution Found?
32 INS. COUNSEL J. 241 n.2 (1965).
1DSee Bergeron v. Prudential Ins. Co., 75 A.2d 709, 711 (N.H. 1950) where the court defined disease and bodily infirmity as follows:
The words "disease" and "bodily infirmity" are construed to be practically synonymous and to refer only to some ailment or disorder of an established or settled character to which the insured is subject, an ailment or disorder which materially impairs,
weakens, or undermines the condition of the insured and is so considerable or significant that it would be characterized as disease or infirmity in the common speech of
men. These words do not include a mere frail general condition so that the powers
of resistance are easily overcome, a tendency to disease, or temporary weakness nor a
normal physical change that inevitably accompanies advancing years.
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insisted upon a narrow definition of the word "disease."" In the fact
situation involved, an ulcer was unknown and dormant before the
accident and was activated to such an extent by the accident that it
ruptured and caused death. Mr. Justice Cardozo decided that the ulcer
was not a disease, and in reaching this conclusion, he stated:
A distinction, then, is to be drawn between a morbid or abnormal condition of such quality or degree that in its natural and
probable development it may be expected to be a source of mischief, in which event it may fairly be described as a disease or an
infirmity, and a condition abnormal or unsound when tested by a
standard of perfection, yet so remote in its potential mischief that
common speech would call it
not a disease or infirmity, but at
12
most a predisposing tendency.
He further pointed out that an insurance policy "is not accepted with
the thought that its coverage is to be restricted to an Apollo or a
Hercules." 3
One body of authority gives the exclusionary clause 14 in the accident
policy a literal construction so that any preexisting disability that contributes, however slightly, to the loss will be sufficient to bar recovery
by the beneficiary. 15 On this ground, recovery has been denied when
an insured died from activation of brain cancer following an accidental fall, 16 when insured stuck a pencil point in his hand while
working and thereafter succumbed to infection, 17 and when an accidental hip injury aggravated a prior sacroiliac condition. 18
See also National Life & Ace. Ins. Co. v. Brogden, 322 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1959, no writ).
11 Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 171 N.E. 914, 915 (N.Y. 1930).
12 Id. at 915.
13 Id. at 915.
14 The typical accident policy "provides that the accident must be the sole and exclusive
cause of death. In addition, it specifically excludes coverage 'if death results either directly
or indirectly, wholly or in part, from a pre-existing disease or infirmity.'" Bronson &
Fields, The Problem of Concurrent Causation of Death under Health and Accident Policies: A Solution Found? 32 INS. COUNSEL J. 241 (1965).
15 See Bewley v. American Home Assurance Co., 450 F.2d 1079 (10th Cir. 1971); Holstine
v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 338 F. Supp. 817 (E.D. Tex. 1972); Mutual Benefit
Health & Ace. Ass'n v. Hudman, 398 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. Sup. 1965); Great Am. Health &
Life Ins. Co. v. Lothringer, 422 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1967, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Combined Am. Ins. Co. v. Jordan, 403 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Bullard, 399 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Tix v. Employers Cas. Co., 368 S.W.2d 105 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston 1963, no writ).
16 Minyen v. American Home Assurance Co., 443 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1971).
'7 Holstine v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 338 F. Supp. 817 (E.D. Tex. 1972). Insured
was afflicted with lymphsoma, a disease of bone marrow, when he was injured.
18 Crowder v. General Ace., Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 21 S.E.2d 772 (Va. 1942). The
strict construction approach is further illustrated by Penn v. Standard Life & Ace. Ins. Co.,
73 S.E. 99 (N.C. 1911), petition for rehearingdismissed, 76 S.E. 262 (N.C. 1912). In the Penn
case the court stated that if without the presence of an "ordinary disease," the accident
itself would not have been sufficient to have caused the death or injury, there could be no
recovery. Id. at 101.
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Directly opposed to this view are the jurisdictions which follow the
rule that if the accident is shown to be the cause of the injury for
which the action is brought, plaintiff can recover. 19 In a Washington
Supreme Court case, the insured suffered a cerebral hemorrhage
which was induced by fright suffered following a near head-on collision.20 The court ruled that the evidence was sufficient to support
the findings that the accident was the cause of injury, and stated:
[T]he injury must stand out as the predominant factor in the
production of the result. . . . People differ so widely in health,
vitality, and ability to resist disease and injury that what may
mean death to one man would be comparatively harmless to
another .... 21
Many courts have introduced the doctrine of proximate cause in
cases where the insured would not have sustained the loss except for
the preexisting disease. 22 These holdings, in effect, place the burden

upon the judge or jury to weigh the preexisting infirmity against the
accident and decide which is the proximate cause. Usually, under this
approach, the court strives to discover whether the accidental means
or the preexisting disease plays the larger role in bringing about the
death or disability of the insured. 23 If the accident was the proximate
cause, recovery is allowed; 24 if the preexisting disease was the proxi19 See New York Life Ins. Co. v. McGehee, 260 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1958); Commercial
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Walsh, 228 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1955); McMackin v. Great Am. Reserve
Ins. Co., 99 Cal. Rptr. 227 (Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Williams v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co.,
434 P.2d 765 (Kan. 1967); Richard v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 128 So. 2d 806
(La. Ct. App. 1961); Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n v. Ratliff, 440 S.W.2d 119 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1969, no writ); Pierce v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 109 P.2d 322
(Wash. 1941).
20 Pierce v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 109 P.2d 322 (Wash. 1941).
21 Id. at 328. It is immaterial that because of a disease or condition from which the
insured is suffering, the consequences of the accident are more injurious than they would
otherwise be. The total ultimate harm sustained is still regarded as caused by the accident
although the harm would not have been so severe had it not been for the disease. See, e.g.,
Commercial Cas. Co. v. Stinson, 111 F.2d 63 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 667 (1940).
22 Weber v. Continental Cas. Co., 379 F.2d 729 (10th Cir. 1967); McMackin v. Great Am.
Reserve Ins. Co., 99 Cal. Rptr. 227, 234 (Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Tix v. Employers Cas. Co.,
368 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1963, no writ); Pierce v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins.
Co.,
109 P.2d 322, 327 (Wash. 1941).
23
In Tix v. Employers Cas. Co., 368 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1963, no
writ), insured died from heart failure following an accident where her car bumper had
interlocked with that of another car in a parking lot. The court held that the exertion
and emotional stimulus caused by the locked bumper incident were either not a cause of
her death or were but remote causes.
The opposite result was reached, however, in Richard v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas.
Ins. Co., 128 So. 2d 806 (La. Ct. App. 1961) where a fatal heart attack resulting from a
minor automobile collision acting upon a preexisting high blood pressure was within the
terms of the accident policy insuring against death caused by accident, directly and independently of all other causes.
24 Valenta v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 196 N.W.2d 393 (N.D. 1972). See also Richard v.
Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 128 So. 2d 806 (La. Ct. App. 1961) where the court
stated:
[I]f the accident is the proximate cause of the death and sets in motion or starts a

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol4/iss3/9

4

Irvine: Where Emotional Stress and Strain Arising from an Automobile Acci

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4

mate cause, recovery is denied. 25 "Both the courts and the parties are
here concerned with which of two necessary conditions, together sufficient to produce an injury or death, should be considered the cause
contemplated by the parties under the terms of their contract. '26
The court in Boring v. Haynes27 recognized the existence of a conflict in this area of insurance law and applied the doctrine of proximate cause to the facts. They held the better reasoned rule to be that
"where an accidental injury aggravates or energizes a dormant disease
or physical ailment the accident may be said to have been the proximate cause of the resulting disability within the terms and meaning
of the ordinary accident insurance policy.

'2

The record in the Boring case revealed that the emotional stress and
strain arising from the automobile accident were superimposed upon
the dormant heart condition and precipitated Boring's death. In holding the insurer liable under the policy, the court stated that "this
fortuitous event constitutes accidental bodily injury within the meaning of the policy provisions ....,,29

Predicting the construction of a particular accident policy in a
given case is far from being simple. "It is difficult to avoid an undesirable polarity in the dilemma of accidental as opposed to pathological causation...."So
Several solutions have been proposed to resolve the conflict. One
article suggests that the exclusionary clause in the insurance policy
be expanded to exclude "death resulting directly or indirectly, wholly
or in part from any pre-existing disease or infirmity even though the
proximate or precipitatingcause of death is accidental bodily injury.5'3
The article also proposes that the emphasis be shifted from the dominant cause of death to the role that the preexisting disease played in
bringing about the death.3 2 These proposed solutions would be advantageous to the insurer.
A second proffered solution is to permit recovery when an accident
latent or dormant disease, and such disease merely contributes to the death after
being so precipitated by the accident, it is not a proximate cause of the death nor a
contributing cause within the meaning of the terms of the policy. Id. at 808.
25 Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Bullard, 399 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1966, writ ref'd, n.r.e.).
26 Comment, Pre-existing Disease and Accident Insurance: Pathology and Metaphysics in
the Common Speech of Men, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 266, 269 (1954).
27 496 P.2d 1385 (Kan. 1972).
28 Boring v. Haynes, 496 P.2d 1385, 1392 (Kan. 1972), citing Williams v. Benefit Trust
Life Ins. Co., 434 P.2d 765, 768 (Kan. 1967).
29 Boring v. Haynes, 496 P.2d 1385, 1393 (Kan. 1972).
30 Comment, Pre-existing Disease and Accident Insurance: Pathology and Metaphysics
in the Common Speech of Men, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 266, 274 (1954).
31 Bronson & Fields, The Problem of Concurrent Causation of Death Under Health and
Accident Policies: A Solution Found? 32 INS. COUNSEL J. 241, 244 (1965) (original emphasis).
32 Id. at 245.
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